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Abstract 
The main theme of the paper is about the challenges that financial sector liberalization poses to 
local banks. It reviews the experience of Singapore. We begin by explaining the unique circum-
stances surrounding Singapore. A small city-state controlled by a single party with about 65% ma-
jority in Parliament, Singapore has a paternalistic government that can be protective of industries 
that are strategic to the development of the country. Yet its government is also pragmatic, forward-
looking and pro-reformists. Because of its unique circumstances, the Singapore experience with 
liberalization is worth studying. Three key ideas will emerge in the paper. First, the results of our 
econometric studies illustrate the extent of influence that financial sector reforms have on integrat-
ing the domestic stock market in Singapore with major markets in US and Japan. The results con-
firm strong statistical evidence of financial market integrations. The second idea studies the impact 
that liberalization poses to the management strategy of the local banks. We saw a range of re-
sponses such as consolidation, regional expansion, search for efficiency, best risk management 
practices to adoption of technology. The third idea is to gain insights on the prospects of financial 
intermediation activities as a result of market liberalization. The findings in the paper are rein-
forced by the results of a market survey we conducted. The survey was conducted to review how 
reforms have influenced the perception of market players on banking environment.  
Key words: Financial Services Liberalization; Bank Management, Financial Institutions and Services 
JEL classification: G2. 
1. Introduction 
This paper discusses the experience of Singapore with regards to the challenges that financial sec-
tor liberalization poses to local banks. Because of its unique political-economic structure, the Sin-
gapore experience with liberalization is worth studying. A small city-state controlled by a single 
party with about 65% majority in Parliament, Singapore has a paternalistic government that can be 
protective of industries that are strategic to the development of the country. An interesting struc-
ture of the corporate landscape is that the government owns, through its investment arm Temasek 
Holdings, stakes in many of Singapore's largest companies, such as in telecommunications giant 
(SingTel), Singapore Airlines, port services (PSA International), mass rapid transit (SMRT 
Corporation), utility (Singapore Power) and in shipping (Neptune Orient Lines). It holds 
investments in public icons like the Raffles Hotel and the Singapore Zoological Gardens. It also 
holds a stake in Singapore Pools, the only legal betting company in Singapore. And in banking, the 
largest of the local banks Development Bank of Singapore (or, DBS Group) is 28% owned by the 
Temasek Holdings. Thus seen, the government has been protective of industries that are strategic 
to the development of the country. In the recent decade however, the government has been gradu-
ally removing its protective policies as well as its stakes in key sectors of the economy such as 
banking, telecommunications and utility. 
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Much has already been written about the liberalization process of the financial sector in Singapore 
(for review, see Tan, 2005). In this paper, the focus instead is to present a framework to analyze 
the challenges that liberalization poses on the local banks. To begin, we briefly describe the back-
ground of the banking sector. We discuss the approach the state has adopted and the circumstances 
that compel the state to pursue liberalization. We discuss the extent that financial sector liberaliza-
tion in a country has led to integration of its domestic equity market with foreign equity markets. 
The discussion leads to several interesting issues: how regulatory changes have affected the man-
agement strategy of local banks. What impact would they have on intermediation financial activi-
ties? How have they affected the banks’ search for efficiency and their quest for markets? 
The financial sector is dominated by the banking industry with a two-tier structure that consists of 
wholesale and retail banking. In retail banking, foreign banks face more operational restrictions as 
compared to wholesale banking. Moreover for strategic development reasons, the local banking 
groups have a strong presence in the retail banking sector. Recently however, the government has 
taken some steps to relax its control on the retail banking sector. Phased over two stages between 
the periods 1999 to 2004, the first phase was about creating the environment for domestic financial 
institutions to develop their capabilities, strengthen their management teams, seek out global op-
portunities and expand their presence in the region. The outcome was numerous industry consoli-
dations, which resulted in a decline in the number of Singaporean banks from five units to three 
units, as well as some prominent regional acquisitions by the local banks.  
In the second phase beginning in 2001, the government granted what is called “qualifying full 
bank” (QFB) licenses to six foreign banks which are recognized to have established an important 
presence in the Singapore economy. With the licence, foreign banks can increase their number of 
service locations to a maximum of twenty-five from the previous limit of fifteen, effective 1 Janu-
ary 2005. The twenty-five locations could either be brick-and-mortar branches or offsite Auto-
matic Teller Machines (ATM) locations.  The foreign banks could share among themselves their 
network of about 150 ATMs located across Singapore. Coupled with a change in ruling after June 
30, 20061 that allowed the qualified foreign banks to apply for access to local ATM networks, 
these measures would provide the foreign banks with significant scope to expand their presence in 
the domestic market. They also could provide electronic funds transfer, point-of-sale debit ser-
vices, accept Central Provident Fund (CPF) fixed deposits, and provide Supplementary Retirement 
Scheme and CPF Investment Scheme accounts. Many of these services had happened in recent 
years.  
The timing of the five-year program of banking reforms was planned ahead of Singapore’s im-
pending negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with its major trading partners (for exam-
ple, US, Canada, Mexico, India, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Bahrain, Panama and New Zealand). Singa-
pore’s goods sector has been recognized as being fairly open to free trade already2, which leaves 
the services sector, especially the financial sector as a possible target of negotiation for freer trade, 
and hence greater competition for the local institutions. Thus, the timing of banking reforms was 
seen as critical in setting the pace for the local banks to be ready to hold their own when competi-
tion comes into force. The idea is to nurture healthy and fair competition that can strengthen the 
incentives for local banks to improve efficiency and grow in resilience and maturity.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we used econometrics techniques to measure the 
extent that financial sector liberalizations have brought about integration of the Singapore’s stock 
market with the US, Japan and Hong Kong markets. The results provided some perspectives on the 
pace liberalizations preferred by the state. In section 3, we discuss the impact that liberalizations 
                                                          
1A complete list of  reforms can be found at this website   
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2002/Free_Trade_with_Singapore_America's_First_Free_Trade_Agre
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have on management strategy of local banks. In section 4 we discuss the prospects of financial 
intermediation activities, based on the classifications that there are four types of intermediations 
within and between domestic providers and foreign users of capital. The last section gives the con-
clusion.  
2. Financial Sector Integration 
The financial sector in Singapore has grown rapidly over the past four decades, so much so it has 
become an integral part of the global financial system. By global ranking, Singapore is now the 
fifth largest derivative market, after London, Tokyo, New York and Paris – this is a major 
achievement for Singapore given its humble beginnings. The average daily turnover of foreign 
exchange transactions in Singapore in 2004 was US$125 billion, placing Singapore the fourth 
largest global centre for foreign exchange activity.  
To measure how integrated the market has been with the rest of the world, we conducted two 
econometric studies.  In the first study, we examined Singapore’s stock market integration with US 
and Japan markets by measuring and attributing the volatility of Singapore’s equity prices vis-a-
vis the two markets using Akdogan (1996) model. In the second study, we tested for the presence 
of long-term integration between Singapore’s financial integration with US, Japan and Hong Kong 
using the Johansen co-integration test.  
We explain the methodology of the two studies and make inferences about the results.  
(i) Econometric model #1 
In the first study we measured Singapore market’s beta against the United States benchmark and 
Japan benchmark1. The US market was chosen as a benchmark to represent the major developed 
markets, while the Japan market was used as a benchmark to represent the Asian regional market. 
The US market is a reasonable proxy to use to capture the integration of the Singapore with the 
major global markets, because as measured by the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
All Country World Index of equity markets, the weight of the USA index is more than half the 
world market capitalization. The Japan market is a reasonable proxy for the Asian regional market 
because of its geographical proximity, and being a single index, the advantage of using it is that it 
can capture the regional effect.    
McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) measured the degree of financial market integration by studying the 
volatility of emerging market bond prices. We chose not to use bond market indices because the 
lack of liquid secondary bond market in Singapore and the region could mean that using the bond 
market indices may not truly capture the underlying degree of integration of a broad financial sec-
tor such as Singapore. 
We extended the Akdogan (1996) model 
ttrutusustsgp URcR εββ +++= ,,, , (1) 
where tsgpR ,   is the log return on the price index of the Singapore stock market and tusR ,   is the 
log return on the price index of the US stock market. tε  is the residual of country i assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. trU ,  is obtained as the residual from 
the following regression 
                                                          
1  This paper is an extension of what was done in Akdogan (1996). See Zheng and Tan (2006) for alternative approach to 
modeling stock market returns using GARCH (1,1) model.     
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trtustjap
URcR ,,1, ++= β ,  (2) 
where tjapR ,  is the contemporaneous logarithmic return of country Japan. By construction, the 
term Ur,t, captures stock market shocks in the region that are unrelated to shocks in the major 
global markets. There is the possibility of common news driving both regional and major markets, 
thus some correlation is expected between these stock market indices. This means that if the stan-
dard market indices were used directly in the equation (1), the problem with multi-collinearity 
could lead to unreliable assessments of the relative strength of explanatory variables. To overcome 
this, the indices were orthogonalized as seen in (2).  
Taking the variance of both sides of equation (1),  
222222
εδδβδβδ ++= uuusussgp .   (3) 
Equation (3) says that total risk associated with Singapore portfolio can be divided into three com-
ponents: the US (or global) risk, the Japan (or regional) risk and country-specific risk. Dividing 
both sides of (3) by 
2
sgpδ  we obtain 
1=++ CBA  (4) 
with    A = 2
22
sgp
usw
δ
δβ
, B = 2
22
sgp
uu
δ
δβ
   and C = 2
2
sgpδ
δε
,       
where term A is the measure of Singapore’s integration with the global market, while B is the 
measure of Singapore’s integration with the regional market. A higher value of A (or B) suggests 
that the Singapore market has become more integrated with the US (or Japan) benchmark market.   
By contrast, a lower value of A (or B) implies a greater degree of segmentation from the US (or 
Japan) benchmark market. The variable C measures the risk of the Singapore portfolio that is asso-
ciated with its country-specific factor. It is a measure of the changes in the Singapore stock market 
price index that are due to circumstances that are unique and specific to Singapore itself.  
The data used were the weekly equity indices between the periods of January 1985 to December 
2004, expressed in US dollars, as compiled by Datastream. The indices used were the Singapore 
Straits Times Index (for Singapore), the Nikkei 225 Stock Average (for the Japanese benchmark) 
and the S&P 500 (for the US benchmark). We chose to use weekly returns for the following rea-
sons.  Firstly, weekly returns avoid the problems of day-of-the-week effects of daily data, as well 
as the well-known January/December effect of monthly data. The second advantage is that by 
computing the Friday-to-Friday period, it is possible for the weekly data on equity returns in dif-
ferent national markets to overlap, so that the market information that impacts the equity markets 
could be shared among countries.  
We carried out the estimation of the econometric model over two-yearly sub-periods starting from 
1985 and ending 2004. Computations of the integration scores are reported in Table 1 and Figure 
1. The degrees of Singapore’s stock market integration with the major global markets and regional 
market are represented by lines A and B respectively, while line C measures risk due to country-
specific factor. 
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Table 1 
 Financial Sector Integration Scores 
 Variable 
  A (Global) B (Regional) C (Country-specific) 
1985-1987 0.06 0.04 0.91 
1987-1989 0.30 0.08 0.61 
1989-1991 0.12 0.24 0.65 
1991-1993 0.10 0.05 0.84 
1993-1995 0.03 0.01 0.95 
1995-1997 0.06 0.04 0.91 
1997-1999 0.24 0.09 0.67 
1999-2001 0.07 0.11 0.82 
2001-2003 0.23 0.06 0.71 
2003-2005 0.19 0.23 0.58 
Note: ‘A’ measures Singapore’s integration with the global market, ‘B’ measures Singapore’s integration 
with the regional market, and ‘C’ measures the risk of the Singapore portfolio that is associated with its 
country-specific factor. 
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Note: Country-specific factor (line C) has decreased over time. By contrast, the degree of Singapore’s stock 
market integration with the global market (line A) and with the regional market has increased over time.  
Fig. 1. Financial Sector Integration Scores 
It is observed that the score for Singapore’s country-specific factor has decreased in value between 
the periods from 1985-1987 to 2003-2005; the integration score fell from 0.91 to 0.58. By contrast, 
the degree of integration with the global market has increased over time; the global factor score 
rose from 0.06 to 0.19. Likewise, the degree of integration with the regional market has increased 
over time; the regional factor score rose from 0.04 to 0.23. There were crisis periods when the 
global factor score registered unusually sharp rises. These were seen during the 1987-1989, 1997-
1999 and 2001-2003 when the scores rose by more than twenty-fold, compared to normal periods. 
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External factors, namely the US stock market crash and the Asian financial crisis, could provide 
explanations of these.   
(ii) Econometric model #2 
In the second study, we tested for the presence of long-term integration between Singapore’s fi-
nancial integration with the global and regional markets using the Johansen co-integration test1. 
Co-integration theory states that if two or more stock market indices are co-integrated, then there 
exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two series. Thus, by studying whether there 
is a co-integration relationship between the Singapore stock market and other stock markets, we 
could test statistically if the process of financial liberalizations in Singapore over time has caused 
Singapore’s financial market to be integrated into the world market and regional market.  
The economies used in this comparison are the United States, Japan and Hong Kong and the time 
period examined were from January 1985 to January 2005. The estimation periods were divided 
into three sub-periods: (i) January 4, 1985 to January 2, 1987; followed by (ii) January 9, 1987 to 
January 3, 1997; and (iii) January 10, 1997 to December 31, 2004.    
Similar to the first study, weekly equity index returns, in US dollar terms, were obtained from 
Datastream. The stock market indices were the Singapore Straits Times Index (for Singapore), the 
Nikkei 225 Stock Average (for Japan), the S&P 500 (for the United States) and the Hang Seng 
Index (for Hong Kong). The Johansen co-integration test was then used to test for co-integration 
between these equity indices. 
Co-integration theory states that if two time series, ty and tx , are integrated of order 1, which is  
denoted as an I(1) process, then in general, the relationship tt xy β− , is also integrated of order 1, 
for any number β . Nevertheless, it is possible that for some ,0≠β the relationship tt xy β−  
has an I(0) process. In our study, we first tested the stock indices for the respective countries for 
stationarity, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The test is based on the OLS regres-
sion with the null hypothesis of 01 =a . 
tit
p
i
itt yyty εβααβ +∆+++=∆ −
=
− ∑
1
1100 .      
We applied the ADF test on the four equity market indices, for each of the three sub-periods. The 
analysis showed that the null hypothesis could not be rejected in all the countries we considered, 
which suggested that the equity price series are non-stationary.    
Next, we conducted the test for co-integration between the Singapore stock market with the US, 
Japanese and Hong Kong markets using the Johansen co-integration test.  Following the Johansen 
(1988) procedure, we focused on the model 
ttt XAAX ε++= −110 .                                                          
This can be rewritten as 
ttt XAX ε+Π+=∆ −10     IA −=Π 1 ,                                               
where r is the rank of the matrix Π , with the rank of Π  equals the number of co-integrating vec-
tors. If rank Π  = 0, the matrix is null. Since there is no linear combination of the ( itX ) processes 
that is stationary, the variables are not co-integrated. Instead, if Π  is of rank n, the vector process 
                                                          
1 Similar use of this methodology can be found in the works by Sheng and Tu (2000) and Cheung and Liu (1994).  
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is stationary; if rank Π  = 1, there is a single co-integrating vector; if 1 < rank Π  < n, there are 
multiple co-integrating vectors. The results of the Johansen test are presented in Table 2 below. 
Table 2  
The Johansen Test for Financial Integration 
   Null Trace Statistic CV* (5%) p-value  
Singapore 1985-1987 US  r=0 1/ 4.28 15.49 0.88 
   r<=1 2/ 0.74 3.84 0.39 
  Japan r=0 10.04 15.49 0.28 
   r<=1 1.04 3.84 0.31 
  Hong r=0 7.47 15.49 0.52 
  Kong r<=1 1.48 3.84 0.22 
Singapore 1987-1997 US  r=0 6.49 15.49 0.64 
   r<=1 1.97 3.84 0.16 
  Japan r=0 9.47 15.49 0.32 
   r<=1 0.12 3.84 0.73 
  Hong  r=0 6.13 15.49 0.68 
  Kong r<=1 0.19 3.84 0.66 
Singapore 1997-2005 US  r=0 15.07 15.49 0.06 
   r<=1 2.90 3.84 0.09 
  Japan r=0 10.89 15.49 0.22 
   r<=1 3.18 3.84 0.07 
  Hong r=0 25.95** 15.49 0.0009** 
  Kong r<=1 6.49** 3.84 0.01** 
1/ The null r=0 is tested against the alternative of r>0.  
2/ The null r<=1 is tested against the alternative of r>1. 
* CV: Critical value 
The low p-values suggest at the 10% confidence level, the presence of long run equilibrium exists between 
the Singapore stock market index and each of the countries’ stock price indices. 
 
From Table 2, we noted that the p-values during the periods of 1985-1987 and 1987-1997 were 
very large. The large p-values suggest that statistically, there was no evidence of long run equilib-
rium between the Singapore stock price index and any of the other countries’ stock price indices. 
However during the period of 1997-2005, the p-values dropped to less than 0.1 (with the exception 
of when we are testing for integration with Japan using the null hypothesis of r=0). This suggests, 
at the 10% confidence level, that long run equilibrium exists between the Singapore stock market 
index and each of the countries’ stock price indices.  
The econometric test suggested that there was statistical evidence of integration of the financial 
sector between Singapore and the US, and Singapore and the regional economies1. The economet-
ric estimate showed that the pace of liberalization, as measured by the financial integration score, 
has been relatively slow over the last two decades. The results of our econometric estimates were 
consistent with the market view that the Singapore government has been inclined to take a “mini-
bang” instead of a “big bang” approach to liberalization. The Singapore government is known to 
                                                          
1 Our empirical findings, that the Singapore’s financial market is integrated with the rest of the world, are consistent with 
the results in the paper “Financial Market Integration in Singapore: The Narrow and the Broad Views”, by the MAS, where 
three macroeconomic benchmarks for evaluating the degree of financial market integration were conducted.  
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prefer a gradualist approach to liberalizing the financial sector to foreign competition without 
compromising the soundness of the domestic financial system or conduct of the monetary policy, 
or jeopardizing the stability of the economy. Examples of the gradualist approach could be seen in 
the government’s relaxation of the policy of the non-internationalization of the Singapore dollar. 
Another example was the five-year program of banking reforms which were phased over two 
stages between the period of 1999 to 2004. The results of the econometric estimates provided in-
teresting study of how a gradualist, pragmatic interventionist approach to liberalization in the case 
of Singapore could work in the real world, as opposed to the much touted neo-classical approach 
that often called for rapid liberalization with minimum government intervention.  
3. Impact on Management Strategy of Local Banks 
In Section 2, we measure the extent that financial sector liberalizations have brought about integra-
tion of the Singapore’s stock market with the US, Japan and Hong Kong markets. The results 
showed strong statistical evidence of financial market integrations, and the discussions provided 
some perspectives on the pace liberalizations preferred by the state. In this section, we study the 
impact of liberalizations on management strategy of local banks, which saw a range of responses 
from consolidation, regional expansion, search for efficiency, best risk management practices to 
adoption of technology. We also consider the impact of liberalizations on management strategy 
from the perspective of what we call the product/market matrix. In the next section we provide a 
different perspective on liberalization by studying the impact on the financial intermediation ac-
tivities using the following classification of activities (within and between domestic providers). 
To begin, the government has been prodding the local banks to consolidate and strengthen their posi-
tions in the local market. The Chairman of the central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) Lee Hsien Long (2001) noted that “…being big is no guarantee for success, as shown by the 
persistent difficulties of the Japanese banks over the last decade .... But being a small bank is defi-
nitely a significant handicap”. This seemed to suggest that the state feared local banks cannot remain 
niche players, sizeable in the domestic market, yet small by international standards. The fear is justi-
fiable as competition is expected to intensify with continued consolidation in the banking industry 
globally (more so in US and Europe). The past decade already saw numerous very large bank merg-
ers, like JP Morgan Chase with Bank One (2004); JP Morgan with Chase-Manhattan Bank (2000); 
Citicorp with Travellers Group (1998); UBS with Swiss Bank Corp (1997); Mitsubishi Bank with 
Bank of Tokyo (1996); and Chase Manhattan with Chemical Bank (1996).  
The outcome of the state’s persuasion was a major banking consolidation that resulted in three 
banking groups, down from seven groups previously – in less than five years. DBS Bank became 
the largest Singapore bank followed by UOB Bank (which merged with OUB Bank in 2001) and 
OCBC Bank (which bought Keppel-Tat Lee Bank in 2001). Despite the consolidation, the asset 
size of the three major local banks adds up to less than US$ 0.1 trillion (see Table 3 below). Com-
bined, the asset size of the three major local banks is small according to international standards, in 
comparison with the asset size of the top global banks such as US Citigroup at US$ 1.19 trillion, 
JP Morgan at US$1.1 trillion, and BOA/Fleet Boston at US0.97 trillion.  
Table 3 
Total Assets of Singapore Banks, as of end of 2003 
 Assets (S$ million) 
Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) 159,959 
United Overseas Bank (UOB) 113,446 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp (OCBC) 83,497 
Note: The combined asset size of the three major local banks is small by international standards.  
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
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In addition to the government’s urge for consolidation, it has also prodded the local banks to take 
the acquisition route for further growth. Fortuitously market deregulation in neighboring econo-
mies has increased acquisitions opportunities for Singapore local banks. As their economies grow, 
banks would need to support business expansion and risk management requirements. This means 
that less developed banking systems in the region will be seeking additional capital, as well as 
world class management and operational expertise which can likely be met by foreign investors. 
Singapore banks have been taking advantage of the opportunity to invest into growing economies 
in Asia. Local banks acquired retail subsidiaries in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippines and Thai-
land. For example, DBS’ acquisition of Thailand’s Thai Danu in 1998 and Hong Kong’s Dao 
Heng Bank in 2001; DBS’ joint venture with Indonesia’s PT Bank in 2000; UOB’s 75% equity 
stake in Thailand’s Radanasin Bank, and UOB’s signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Beijing Securities Co. Ltd. in June 2003 to set up a fund management company in China.  
Besides the activities of local banks, the government has carried out its regionalization drive 
through its investment arm, Temasek Holdings. In Malaysia, it invested in the holding company of 
Alliance Bank Malaysia, Malaysian Plantations in 2005; in Pakistan it invested in NDLC-IFIC 
Bank in 2005; in Thailand it invested in Siam Commercial Bank in 2004; and in Indonesia it ac-
quired PT Bank Danamon Indonesia through a consortium with Deutsche Bank in 2003, and PT 
Bank International Indonesia through a consortium with Kookmin Bank, ICF Financial Group 
Holdings and Barclays Bank in 2004. On a global stand, Temasek Holdings acquired a 12% stake 
in Standard Chartered Bank in 2006. 
Table 4 gives an interesting illustration on the stages of consolidation, market characteristics and 
government involvement.  
Table 4 
Stages of Consolidation in the Banking Sectors 
 Domestic consolidation 
(Stage I) 
Attract cross-
border 
Investments 
(Stage II) 
Regional / Global expansion 
(Stage III) 
Stage of 
Consolidation 
India Taiwan Japan 
China 
Malaysia 
 
Korea 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Australia 
N. Zealand 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
North America, 
Developed  
European 
countries 
Market charac-
teristics 
Fragmented domestic market. 
Large numbers of small and 
medium sized banks. 
Improved bank 
infrastructure. 
Fewer, but 
stronger banks. 
Reduced risk for 
investors. 
Home market saturation. 
Government 
involvement 
Policies and guidelines to en-
courage domestic consolidation. 
Schemes to restructure national 
and state owned banks. 
Changes to banking regulators 
to reduce cross-shareholding. 
Increase capital adequacy ratios 
(CAR).  
Initiate deregulation initiatives 
Implementation of banking standards, eg Basel Accord, 
corporate governance, tax laws and accounting trans-
parency. 
Implement deregulation programs. 
Develop capital markets, e.g. debt markets.  
 
 
Source: The Changing Banking Landscape in Asia Pacific: A report of Bank Consolidation, Deloitte and 
Touche, 2005. 
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Singapore is considered to be at stage III of consolidation, while Japan is considered to be at stage 
I. This ranking is not surprising, given Singapore’s unique circumstances of being a small city 
state with small handful of domestic banks and having a strong-willed government insistent on 
regional expansion. It is also helped by the fact that with DBS being 28% owned by the govern-
ment, one would expect it to be used as a vehicle by the state to take a lead role in the state’s pur-
suit for liberalization. Japan, on the other hand, is a large country with many banks (large and 
small), and has not had a strong visionary government for many years.  
One ruling that has been relaxed is the foreign shareholding limits on locally-incorporated banks, 
in anticipation that when local banks operate outside the domestic market, they may need to grow 
bigger in order to hold their own and be viable. In this regard, the government has removed foreign 
shareholding limits on locally-incorporated banks to allow the local banks to tap the equity market 
more flexibly. When the time is right and the opportunity arises, they can form strategic partner-
ships with foreign banks.  
Liberalization dictates the need for banks in Singapore to improve on their efficiency. Leong, 
Dollery and Coelli (2002) highlighted a few factors that can influence bank efficiency. One of 
them is through changes in structure of regulation and organization. In the case of Singapore, the 
MAS’ change in regulation that requires banks to divest non-core assets and invest into core busi-
ness in financial services is one example of how regulatory factors are used to raise the standard of 
efficiency. Another example is the MAS ruling on requirements for board nomination and com-
pensation committees, as well as for a majority of directors who are separately independent of 
management and substantial shareholders. As Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993: 243) observed: 
“It seems likely that regulation has also had effects on efficiency by influencing a financial institu-
tion’s organizational structure”.  
Another factor that Leong, Dollery and Coelli (2002) highlighted was effective risk management 
practices. In the face of informational asymmetry, successful identification of risk can enable 
banks to determine effective protection strategies against unanticipated losses. A balanced risk-
reward profile may lead managers to greater competitive flexibility in terms of pricing, capital 
allocation and business strategy. With the expansion of regional operations, local banks would be 
subjected to a higher degree of business risk. So risk management plays a critical role in maintain-
ing the safety and soundness of banks. This is especially important since the MAS' supervisory 
approach towards all banks has moved away from tooth-combing for compliance with regulations 
towards one of assessing the quality of governance, controls and risk management processes.  In 
Singapore the banks are mandated to have systems and risk management practices that are com-
mensurate with the scale and complexity of their operations. Higher banking disclosure standards, 
greater transparency in corporate finance and processes related to the Stock Exchange of Singa-
pore were also introduced. The Committee on Banking Disclosure’s recommendations in 1998 
aimed to raise the standard of financial disclosure to be closer to European and US standards. In 
1998, for the first time banks disclosed doubtful loan provisions classified into specific and gen-
eral, loan portfolio by industry, current market values of investments, sources of revenue and ex-
penses, and details of off-balance sheet transactions. 
Another factor that Leong, Dollery and Coelli (2002) highlighted was the adoption of technology. 
Banks worldwide have invested a lot in information technology to develop e-banking as a new 
generation of customers will want to do business over the internet. The assumption is that large 
banks with a large customer base will be able to spread out the fixed costs; smaller banks will not 
be able to do so effectively. There is counter-argument that small, yet specialist players have the 
opportunities to thrive, for example in niche areas such as investment banking, if they distinguish 
themselves through depth of expertise and distributional reach.  
Lastly, we consider the impact of liberalizations on management strategy from the perspective of 
what we call the product/market matrix. In Figure 2 we drew a two-by-two product/market matrix 
which forms the four strategic options available to banks.  
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 Existing Markets New Markets 
 
New Products 
 
Option 2: Introduction of new 
products/ services, e.g. wealth 
management, investment products 
Option 4: New products in joint-
ventures/ acquisitions 
Existing Products 
 
Option 1: Operational efficiencies Option 3: Joint venture / acquisi-
tion of retail subsidiaries 
Note: We identify the two-by-two product/market matrix as a four-strategic option for local banks.  
Fig. 2. Products/Markets Matrix 
The first option is to compete within the existing market offering the same products/services as 
before. To compete well in this option, the banks would need to improve on their operational effi-
ciency. This means that the banks would have to put their act together to offer banking prod-
ucts/services at a lower rate than their competitors. Another avenue of growth lies in the second 
option, which is to introduce new banking products and services in existing market. The recent 
proliferation in new wealth management and investment-related products in Singapore showed that 
the banks were aggressively pursuing this strategy.  This strategy is supported by our finding in an 
exploratory interview of about 40 market players. We conducted the interview to gauge the per-
ception of market players on the banking environment after the recent round of liberalization in 
2001. It was shown that wealth management was the most promising sector by survey participants 
in the local banks (see Table 5).  
Table 5 
Promising Sectors in Singapore for the Financial Institutions to Grow 
Local institutions  % Foreign institutions  % 
Retail lending    
Corporate lending 
Fund management             
Wealth management  
Risk management 
Insurance  
Stock broking 
Fixed income (debt) 
Derivatives 
Universal processing 
Alternatives investments (hedge funds, 
private equity, REITS)   
43.2 
45.9 
35.1 
56.8 
27.0 
18.9 
 8.1 
16.2 
21.6 
10.8 
29.7 
Retail lending    
Corporate lending 
Fund management             
Wealth management  
Risk management 
Insurance  
Stock broking 
Fixed income (debt) 
Derivatives 
Universal processing 
Alternatives investments (hedge funds, 
private equity, REITS) 
27.0 
16.2 
40.5 
86.5 
18.9 
 8.1 
 2.7 
21.6 
37.8 
 2.7 
40.7 
Note: We conducted an interview to gauge the perception of market players on the banking environment after 
the recent round of liberalization in 2001. It was shown that wealth management was the most promising 
sector by participants in the local banks.  
 
The third strategy is to extend the existing operations to the region. Essentially the bank would be 
offering the traditional banking products and services overseas in the region. In practice, this is 
achieved through acquisition of a local bank in the region.  In the market survey we conducted, our 
respondents were asked on their perceptions of the most promising markets for the local institu-
tions. The three most important markets highlighted were China, Indonesia and India (see Table 
6). 78.4% of the respondents indicated that China would be one of the most important markets for 
the local financial institutions; 45.9% indicated Indonesia and 43.2% indicated India.  In contrast 
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only 16.2% indicated Singapore. Hence, the findings suggested that there has to be a push for the 
local institutions to look beyond Singapore for growth.  
Table 6 
What the Local Financial Institutions Considered as their Important Markets in The Future 
 
China 
Taiwan  
Korea 
India 
Middle East 
% 
78.4 
 5.4 
21.6 
43.2 
27.0 
 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
% 
16.2 
29.7 
18.9 
 2.7 
45.9 
Note: In the market survey we conducted, our respondents were asked on their perceptions of the most 
promising markets for the local institutions. The three most important markets highlighted were China, 
Indonesia and India.  
 
The fourth option may offer the most promise for growth. It involves the banks creating new prod-
ucts and services that are relevant in the foreign markets. But it is also the most challenging be-
cause it requires an understanding of a series of issues – the business and hence the needs of the 
bank clients, the market environment, the competitors and the regulatory environment. Thus not 
surprisingly, banks in Singapore have preferred to seek partners with local expertise in the target 
market, either through acquisitions joint ventures.  
4. Challenges of Liberalization from Perspective of Financial Intermediation  
In this section we provide a different perspective on liberalization by studying the impact on the 
financial intermediation activities using the following classification of activities (within and be-
tween domestic providers and foreign users of capital, see Table 7).  
Table 7 
 Classification of Financial Market Activities 
Type  (providers – users) Activity 
1  (D – D) Intermediates between domestic providers of capital and domestic 
users of capital. 
2 (F – D) Intermediates between foreign providers of capital and domestic users 
of capital. 
3 (D – F) Intermediates between domestic providers of capital and foreign users 
of capital. 
4 (F – F) Intermediates between foreign providers of capital and foreign users 
of capital. 
D – Domestic; F – Foreign. 
Note: We explain that banks engage in four types of intermediations activities; they are classified as activities 
within and between domestic providers and foreign users of capital.  
 
Local banks faced intense competition with liberalization and little growth opportunities in Type 1 
activities, a result of Singapore’s small domestic market size. There is limited potential for Type 2 
activities to grow because of structural factors inherent to the country, namely its high rate of sav-
ings and large government surpluses.  There is good potential for Type 3 activities for local banks 
to grow given the government’s policy to gradually relax its policy of non-internationalizing the 
Singapore dollar. Of all the types of activities, Type 4 activities of local banks have the best poten-
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tial to grow because of the government’s liberalization policy which forced local banks to venture 
abroad. This would mean more intermediation businesses between foreign providers of capital and 
foreign users of capital. The government’s policy to expand the presence of government-linked 
companies into the region can also result in more Type 4 activities taking place.  
In the remaining section we relate the impact of liberalizations on each of the four types of inter-
mediation activities.  
Type 1 
Until recently, local banks in Singapore have played a dominant role in Type 1 activities by pro-
viding financial intermediation between domestic providers of capital and domestic users of capi-
tal. This type of intermediation activity has been protected from foreign competition largely be-
cause of national interest. The government’s belief was that Singapore needed strong and well-
managed local banks with a significant share of the home market for a resilient and stable financial 
system.  However, as FTA negotiations would mean demand from trading partners for a more lib-
eral services sector, including the financial sector, it would be not possible for the government to 
protect the local banks from foreign competition for too long.  
With a small domestic market and the need to maintain market share, innovation of products and 
services has been another critical strategy for local banks. Examples include selling products and 
services that generate fee-based income (wealth management), packaging of attractive home mort-
gages, innovative products catered to entrepreneurs and mid-sized enterprises.  
Type 2 
For Type 2 activity, which involves the intermediation between foreign providers of capital and 
domestic users of capital, Singapore is relatively less developed compared with the major interna-
tional financial centres such as London and New York for the following reasons: In bank lending, 
there is limited intermediation between foreign providers and domestic users of capital; this is not 
surprising in Singapore because the nation’s domestic savings already provide adequate financing 
for domestic investment. Likewise, in bond finance, activities between foreign providers and do-
mestic users are limited. Again the lack of bond market development in foreign-to-domestic inter-
mediation is not surprising. The government has been prudent in the fiscal management of the na-
tion, and hence there is no major need for the government to issue securities for raising funds. 
However changes in rulings to spearhead the bond market have resulted in decent corporate and 
government bond activities taking place1. On the other hand, there is active intermediation between 
foreign providers and domestic users in Singapore’s equity market, and this is evidenced by the 
heavy participation of foreigners in Singapore’s stock market.  
Type 3 
In the past, the activities in the intermediation between domestic providers and foreign users of 
capital were more limited, in all three types of financing: bank lending, bond and equity financing 
(for Type 3 activity). This was not surprising because the Singapore government has only recently 
relaxed the non-internationalization policy of the Singapore dollar. The primary reason for dis-
couraging the internationalization of the Singapore dollar is to support the country’s monetary 
policy which is centered on the exchange rate, since Singapore is an open economy that is exposed 
to large capital flows. The trade-off of the non-internationalization policy was of course, a less 
vibrant Type 3 market activity. The government is aware of the limitations and in recent years, it 
has raised the ceiling on the lending of Singapore dollars to non-residents. The change in rulings is 
one of the many examples where the government has been more willing to accept calculated risks 
in order to promote the development of its financial sector. In the case of non-internationalization 
of the Singapore dollar, the government has gradually allowed the Singapore dollar to be used out-
side the country as long as they are for non-speculative activities. Given the change in regulation, 
                                                          
1 For more elaboration on the state’s involvement in other service areas of the financial sector, see Tan (2005).  
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we expect to see more intermediation between domestic providers and foreign users of capital 
(Type 3), which can spillover to more banking transaction opportunities for the local banks. Like-
wise, the government’s policy to expand the presence of government-linked companies into the 
region will result in demand for local banks to provide intermediation activities between domestic 
providers of capital and foreign users of capital. 
Type 4 
The local banks have benefited from active intermediation between foreign users and foreign pro-
viders of capital in both bank lending and bond financing (Type 4 activity). In bank lending, the 
banks have participated either directly or indirectly with foreign banks in project financing, corpo-
rate financing and personal finance for clients in South East Asia.  In bond finance, banks have 
benefited from the strong growth seen in the Asian Dollar Bond market (the foreign-to-foreign 
intermediation of the bond market has in some ways helped to make up for the lack of bond mar-
ket development in foreign-to-domestic intermediation, as mentioned earlier). Similarly, in the 
financial futures market, major contracts such as the ten-year Japanese government bond, the Nik-
kei 225 stock average and Taiwan stock index are actively traded. However, in the equity market, 
despite Singapore’s excellent telecommunications infrastructure and the presence of international 
fund management houses, the level of activity in stock transactions between foreign parties is still 
limited, due partly to availability of developed stock market exchanges in the region to facilitate 
their own domestic markets’ needs.  
We expect a different Type 4 activity to grow in the form of local banks and companies expanding 
their presence overseas. The expansion, a result of the government’s liberalization policy which 
forced local banks to venture abroad, would mean that there will be more intermediation busi-
nesses between foreign providers of capital and foreign users of capital from the local banks’ per-
spective. Likewise, the government’s policy to expand the presence of government-linked compa-
nies into the region will result in demand for local banks to provide intermediation activities be-
tween foreign providers of capital and foreign users of capital.  
5. Conclusion    
We began by using some econometric techniques to measure the extent that financial sector liber-
alizations have brought about integration of the Singapore’s stock market with the US, Japan and 
Hong Kong markets. The results showed strong statistical evidence of financial market integra-
tions, and the discussions provided some perspectives on the pace liberalizations preferred by the 
state. Next, we studied the impact of liberalizations on management strategy of local banks. In 
reaction to the phased liberalization measures of the Singapore government, local banks have 
worked on improving their operational efficiencies. These were evidenced in the restructuring ex-
ercises by banks to divest non-core assets and the reconstitution of their board to enhance their 
corporate governances. Another avenue banks took to improve efficiency was through sound risk 
management practices. Banks were required to installed sound systems to ensure that risk man-
agement practices were in line with the scale and complexity of their operations. Banks resorted to 
investment in technology to improve their efficiencies. Besides the search for bank efficiency, 
banks saw the need to expand their markets beyond the shores of Singapore as the domestic mar-
ket was getting more and more competitive and saturated. 
We also considered the impact of liberalizations on management strategy from the perspective of 
what we call the product/market matrix. Lastly, we provided a different perspective on liberaliza-
tion by studying the impact on the financial intermediation activities using the following classifi-
cation of activities (within and between domestic providers). Using the classification of Types 1 to 
4 activities, we drew attention to opportunities and limitation for growth as a result of liberaliza-
tion. While there is limited potential for Types 1 and 2 activities to grow, there is good potential 
for Types 3 and 4 activities.  
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For a summary of the main points in the article about Singapore’s experience with financial sector 
reforms and the challenges it posed to management strategies of the local banks, see Figure 3 be-
low. 
Liberalization 
Perception of 
Environment 
Search for 
Bank Efficiency 
Quest for 
Markets 
Policy Actions 
By Govt 
Strategic 
Responses 
By Banks 
 
Note: Given Singapore’s unique eco-political structure, the nature and extent of liberation of the financial 
section have largely been driven by deliberate governmental policy actions. 
Fig. 3. Diagrammatic Summary of the Impact of Liberalizations on Banks 
We explained that given Singapore’s unique eco-political structure, the direction and extent of 
liberalization of the financial section is extrinsically driven by deliberate governmental policy ac-
tions. The results of our econometric analysis showed that the Singapore government preferred 
multiple time delayed “mini-bangs” over a “big bang” approach to liberalizing the financial sector. 
The Singapore government realized the impracticality of protecting its financial sector from for-
eign competition in the long-run. And yet, it also preferred a deliberate phased-approach to liber-
alization, in order to give the local institutions sufficient time to restructure and refocus their 
strategies. We expect that for a less paternalistic government, the direction for liberalization would 
be more intrinsically driven by motives of the local institutions in the country. For future work, 
there is scope to develop and expand on this idea.  
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